RV SnapPad 最新情報:年間成長率125%の軌跡
月商 $780,000 · 創業者3人 · 従業員20人 · Alberta, Canada
Kent Wilson(Founder, Origen RV Accessories LTD.)· 創業 September 2015 · 記事掲載 — · rvsnappad.com · 元の記事
同じ会社のほかの記事: 更新:今年の総売上1,000万ドル($10M)を突破し、チームは18人に拡大 / 私たちのRV(キャンピングカー)アクセサリー事業は年間690万ドル($6.9M)を稼いでいます【更新】
元々はD2C(消費者直販)だったが、2018年からオムニチャネルに移行し、オンライン再販業者やRVディーラーでも販売。コロナ禍でサプライチェーンに課題が生じたが、複数のメーカー・3PL(物流)パートナーを確保し、B2Cマーケティングを停止するほどの需要があった。ユーザー生成コンテンツ(UGC)やインフルエンサーレビューをFacebook広告やInstagram広告に活用。月商78万ドル(約1億1,700万円)、従業員20人は記事時点(2021年頃)の自己申告
売値の出典: 公式サイトの商品一覧(1ドル150円で換算・定期購入の有無は未確認)(2026-10-14 取得)
By having a strong base of social proof from your early users and social content from well-known members of your (markets) community, you build things you simply can’t “buy” through straight-up marketing spend.
会計: QuickBooks
広告: Facebook Ads, Instagram Ads, Google Adwords, Bing Ads, Google AdSense, Google ads
分析: Google Analytics
crm: HubSpot
customer service: Zendesk
デザイン: Adobe Suite
メール配信: Klaviyo
financing: Shopify Capital
freelance: Fiverr
その他: Google Shopping, Zapier, Printful
決済: Shopify Payments
payroll: Wagepoint
ネットショップ: Shopify
業務: G Suite, Google Workspace, Slack, Notion
reviews: Stamped.io
SNS: Facebook, Instagram, YouTube
stock images: Getty, Unsplash, Pexels
We are the team behind RV SnapPad, the world’s only permanent jack pad. A new consumer product category in the RV industry, permanent jack pads caught on with passionate RV enthusiasts pretty quickly, and we’ve been busy iterating the main product across RV types since launching. Originally a direct-to-consumer brand, we went to omnichannel in 2018, selling across other online re-sellers as well as RV retailers and dealers. Since launching in late 2015, we have grown at 125% year-over-year, except for the pandemic impacted season (2020). SnapPads are now carried by seven major RV distributors and can be found in hundreds of RV dealerships across North America. SnapPad was also named one of the fastest-growing startups in 2019. Want to create a RV accessories store? Learn more ➜
Our sales growth slowed in 2020 (+14%), but not due to lack of demand. In fact, demand spiked due to the pandemic, but our manufacturing and supply chains were severely hampered. To respond to the sudden changes, we had to completely reform our supply chain by adding 4 new US manufacturers as well as spinning up with a new 3PL (distribution) partner. By having a strong base of social proof from your early users and social content from well-known members of your (markets) community, you build things you simply can’t “buy” through straight-up marketing spend. We are still grappling with the follow-on consequences of the pandemic, including rolling labor and material shortages in the US. By September 2020, we were back-ordered by 30,000 pads, despite turning off all marketing and B2C sales on our site in May of that same year. We were only able to resume marketing and online sales in May of this year. Although we are still back-ordered currently, we are on pace to fulfill all outstanding orders and build inventory by the end of 2021. Our growth rate has climbed back up to previous norms as well (130%). Despite the supply struggles, we have continued to release new products, including four new SKUs aimed at the smaller travel trailer/towable RV segment of the market starting in late 2019 and stretching into 2021. This is, by far, the largest market segment, so we are excited to finally offer something for this large swath of RVers. We have also taken on a new growth agency to help us scale our online marketing efforts. Through their efforts, we have discovered that re-purposing UGC (user-generated content) and influencer review content on paid social channels like Facebook and Instagram is extremely effective. We have also added SMS as a key marketing channel, and we are currently finding ways to match the right RVer to the right SnapPad package through this medium. Finally, we were also able to negotiate our first OEM deal with a small, high-end luxury RV manufacturer, meaning they are offering SnapPads as an option straight from the factory. The return to rapid growth this year and the potential for hyper-growth moving forward (300%+) has caused us to double our team since 2019. We have added staff in B2B sales, B2C customer service, digital design, as well as product engineering, R&D. Screenshotof the UGC re-purposed for PPC campaigns:
Our biggest mistake, and our biggest learning opportunity, was not fully understanding more of our manufacturing and supply chain. We began life as a company with a single manufacturer in the US. This supplier both made and shipped our product up until the start of 2020, which allowed us to focus on things like sales, marketing, and brands. That turned out to be a major long-term weakness and risk point, however. Although we had been looking to find other partners before the pandemic hitting in February 2020, we did not make enough of a priority. The reliance on a single partner hamstrung us just as a rising tide of demand was swelling up on the horizon. Our original manufacturing partner was waylaid by staffing and operational issues during COVID, causing our production to grind to a halt. That forced us to accelerate our search for more producers, and, as a result, we had to better understand all of the nitty-gritty aspects of manufacturing our product. From tonnage pressure of different rubber presses to average product throughput per shift, we can now develop internal manufacturing models and projections that will hopefully help avoid any similar issues in the future. On top of the four US manufacturers we now work with, we plan to build and run our dedicated facilities in the near future. It will be expensive to spin up, of course, but it will give us a lot more control over our supply chain.
Once we have our supply chain in order, we have plans to bring at least one more core product to market by the end of 2021, or the start of 2022. This new product line should greatly increase our relevance and market expansion in the aforementioned travel trailer segment. After that, we will begin to introduce other, related leveling accessories under our brand so that our brand becomes a one-stop shop for “total leveling packages”. From there, we will look to accelerate both our B2C online sales as well as sales through our established distribution channels. We are planning to launch a B2C store in Canada by 2022 and then look into other potential markets in Europe and Australia. With a full range of products, a capable growth agency, and a strong supply chain, we believe we can start to hit 300%+ annual growth targets by next year.
The last really good book I read was Range by David Epstein. It’s a look at how generalists can succeed over specialists and why varying your focus and skillset can be extremely beneficial.
Of course, finding product-market fit is paramount. We did this cheaply by taking a grassroots approach - we went directly to users on message boards and ownership groups and asked them to try the product and give us feedback. We also attended RV rallies so we could interact and sell directly to the end consumer. That helped us map the entire awareness pitch over time. When we could eventually afford it, we spent a little bit of money advertising on Facebook and paying very close attention to the comments that would show up on the ads. Our first product iteration - adding drainage channels to the base product - spiked sales by about 25% instantly and was an object lesson in the value of taking feedback seriously. Related to that is the value of user reviews and influencer content. By having a strong base of social proof from your early users and social content from well-known members of your (markets) community, you build things you simply can’t “buy” through straight-up marketing spend. We have also spent a lot of time refining the customer service and UX on our owned channels to lower purchase friction and increase customer happiness and perceived value. No matter how good your product is, you can undermine all of your efforts with a frustrating UX or less than stellar CS. As a result, we have never considered outsourcing customer service/call center functions. One thing we don’t really worry about is follower counts and “likes” on social media. We are active on some channels, but stuff like that tends to be (mostly) vanity metrics.
Website Facebook Instagram YouTube